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Abstract 
 
The main question we address is whether the weak FDI level in the SEE-7 is 
linked to ill-adapted institutions or not. In order to answer it, we need to 
understand the role of institutions in shaping a strong localization advantage for 
FDI. We develop a theoretical framework to understand the relationship 
between Transition, Institutions and inward FDI. We assume that the ability to 
attract FDI depends on the local institutional arrangement. We present our 
pattern of institutional arrangement that may help us understand why, in spite of 
identical institutions, countries attract a different level of FDI. We split the SEE 
into two categories of host countries, each category being characterized by a 
specific institutional arrangement and level of FDI. We conclude with the 
relevance of our proposition to develop an analytical framework where FDI is 
the outcome of a new and well-adapted institutional arrangement. 
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1. Introduction 
After fifteen years of transition, institutions, mainly market and political 
ones, appear to be a strong foundation for a rapid but irreversible shift from 
socialism to market-oriented economy (Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer, 1997; 
Nagy, 2002). However, the economic performances of transitional countries, 
with regard to growth and inward FDI, are unequal so that the quality of 
domestic institutions, and more and more their flexibility and credibility, have 
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emerged as a relevant subject of interest (Daude, Stein, 2007; Fabry, Zeghni, 
2009; Rodrik, Subramanian, 2003).  
Institutions
1
 are a local arrangement of conventions and rules embedded in 
a historical, cultural and geographical context. They are an endogenous element 
of a country‟s economic growth and attractiveness of FDI. The aim of this paper 
is to analyse the link between inward FDI and the institutional arrangement set 
up in seven countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia) in the South East of Europe
2
 (SEE-7). FDI in 
SEE-7 is concentrated at 81,3% in three countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Romania) and the SEE-7 receives 30,2% of the total inward-FDI in the transition 
countries (EBRD, 2009). 
Ethnic origins, religion and culture, combined with the communist legacy, 
make these countries singular. First, they are latecomers in term of FDI hosting 
because the collapse of communism created windows of opportunities for ethnic 
and religious communities but not for FDI. The splitting of the Yugoslav 
Republic into Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, FYR of Macedonia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro was a consequence of internal conflicts and civil wars 
(Broadman et al., 2004). These „new‟ but heterogeneous micro- countries are not 
naturally attractive for FDI because they have small market size and they lack 
intra-regional integration and intangible resources. Second, except Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia and the FYR of Macedonia who were guided by the 
Copenhagen criteria
3
, the SEE have to set up major reforms. New institutions 
need to be introduced and former institutions to be reshaped to support a market-
oriented economy and also democracy. The task is difficult in comparison with 
                                                          
1 For North (1990, p.3), institutions are “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction” including formal institutions (law and regulation) and informal ones (convention). 
Similarly Scott (1995, p.33) defines institutions as “cognitive, normative and regulative structures 
and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviours”. 
2 FIAS (2007) consider as SEE the seven countries we selected and the Republic of Moldova. We 
excluded the Republic of Moldova because it did not receive a consistent amount of inward-FDI 
during the period 1996-2009. 
3 Before accession, Bulgaria and Romania had to fulfil the three main Copenhagen criteria: the 
political criterion (stability of institutions, the level of democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and the respect for and protection of minorities), the economic criterion (efficient market 
economy, capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European 
Union), the Acquis Communautaire criterion (the ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of the Political, Economic and Monetary Union). Croatia and the 
FYR of Macedonia have been candidate countries since 2005. On the 25th of October 2010 the 
European Commission President made it clear that Croatia's accession talks to join the EU may be 
completed by the end of 2011 rather than in the spring, as initially targeted by the Croatian 
Government. The European Commission President referred to chapter 23 of Croatia's accession 
negotiations on fighting corruption as a key test for the country's accession. He said that whilst 
important progress had been made, more concrete reforms were needed. The negotiation process 
of Croatia was interrupted in 2008 over a border dispute with Slovenia, which was resolved by 
arbitration and supported by a referendum in Slovenia. 
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the high rate of poverty and the war disasters that damaged political stability, the 
infrastructure reliabilities, the industrial structures, and affects the foreign 
investors‟ perception of risks. Among countries not devastated by ethnic 
conflicts, the level of corruption, the lack of entrepreneurship mood and 
capabilities, the weaknesses of the industrial structures also deter inward-FDI 
(Gray, Hellman, Ryterman, 2004) so that most of the SEE-7 is at the periphery 
of the EU from a geographical point of view but also from an economic and 
social one
4
. Finally, the SEE-7 has to deal with the challenge of globalization. 
All countries, whatever their development level and historical background, have 
to host inward-FDI to stay competitive. In the specific case of transitional 
countries, FDI may help to upgrade the industry, enhance foreign technologies 
absorptive capacities and promote international trade (Gosh, Wang, 2009; Fabry, 
Zeghni 2003). 
As shortly described, the actual institutional context is a barrier to 
attractiveness and development. The main question we address in this paper is 
whether the weak inward-FDI level is linked to ill-adapted institutions or not. In 
order to answer it, we need to understand the role of institutions in shaping a 
strong localization advantage for FDI. The quest of reliable and safe institutions 
has emerged in the economic literature as a catalyst for growth
5
 and as an 
inward-FDI attractor (Pournarakis, Varsakelis, 2004; Bevan, Estrin, Meyer, 
2004; Bevan, Estrin, 2004). But questions are still arising about institutional 
arrangement as FDI attractor in transition. According to Rodrik (2004), each 
development level generates a specific institutional arrangement. A logical 
prolongation consists in establishing institutional pattern in order to understand 
the trajectories of these countries as well as their attractiveness (Berthelier et al., 
2003). We assume that the ability to attract inward FDI depends on the local 
institutional arrangement.  
This paper aims to understand the relationship between Transition, 
Institutions and inward FDI. It is structured as follows: first of all we discuss the 
link “Institutions and FDI” and consider Institutions as FDI attractors 
particularly in a transitional context. Secondly we will focus on the measurement 
of institutions and explain why the quality of institutions is a derivate from the 
quality of governance. Then we propose a pattern of institutional arrangement 
that may help us understand why, in spite of identical institutions, countries 
attract a different level of FDI. Finally, we conclude with the relevance of our 
proposition to develop an analytical framework where inward FDI is the final 
outcome of a new and well-adapted institutional arrangement. 
 
                                                          
4 According to the World Investment Report (2008), Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia are front 
runners, Albania and Macedonia above potential and the others countries are not mentioned. 
5 See Fabry, Zeghni (2009), Kukeli (2007); Rodrik, Subramanian (2003), Edison (2003), Tidrico 
(2007), Wernick et al. (2009). 
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2. Institutions as FDI attractor 
The relationship between institutions and FDI may have to gain from the 
literature devoted to the link “institutions and growth”. Authors that have studied 
the relationship between institutions and growth stressed that good institutions 
stimulate growth and development rather than the contrary
6
. Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2003) noticed that the quality of institutions has an impact on growth but 
the reverse influence depends on the democratisation process and on the public 
governance. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) show that the quality of 
institutions has a more important effect on the long-term growth than on the 
short term one. Authors like Edison (2003) or Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) 
pointed out that a successful transfer of market institutions depends on path 
dependence and local abilities to make them effective within a local institutional 
arrangement.  
As we mentioned elsewhere (Fabry, Zeghni, 2009), institutions are 
considered globally. They need to be split in different categories in order to take 
into account the communist past dependency (Fabry, Zeghni, 2006; Zweynert, 
Goldschmidt, 2005) that makes some institutions sticky and ill adapted.  
 
2.1. Institutions, FDI and the localization advantage 
As first developed by Dunning (1993), to invest abroad, a firm needs to 
gather simultaneously an ownership advantage, a localization advantage and an 
internalisation advantage (OLI framework). Since the global era, the localization 
advantage gains increasingly in importance.  
This localization advantage is first based on natural assets offered by a 
country to foreign investors (see table 1). These assets may be declined in 
various FDI determinants that influence the firm‟s decision to enter in vertical 
and/or horizontal FDI (Demekas et al, 2007). The ease of doing business in a 
host country depends less on natural assets than on created assets. Such assets, 
considered a localization advantage, have been first developed by authors 
focusing on spillovers, clusters and networks (Barell, Pain, 1999; Campos, 
Kinoshita 2003).  
In transitional countries, FDI agglomeration may be explained more by 
the lack of local infrastructure, by the weakness of the local sub-contractors 
network and even by the unfavourable business environment than by positive 
externalities. This points out, that institutions are a strong part of the localization 
advantage.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 See Acemoglu et al. (2004), Kaufmann, Kraay (2003). 
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Table 1. The localization advantage as FDI determinant 
Asset 
FDI determinants 
MNE strategy 
Aims Explanatory variables 
Natural Costs 
optimization 
Productivity and quality of factors 
mainly labour (cost of unskilled 
labour, pool of skilled labour), 
quality and reliability of 
infrastructures, raw material 
endowments, quality of social and 
political environment, level of 
technology.  
Supply oriented 
(vertical FDI) 
Market shares 
Domestic market 
entry 
Growth of demand, market size, 
consumer preferences, per capita 
income, and access to regional 
markets  
Demand 
oriented 
(horizontal 
FDI) 
New sources of 
competitiveness 
Combination of market access, 
production costs optimization and 
business environment (law and 
regulation, macroeconomic stability, 
taxes, presence of local or foreign 
competitors, distances) 
Global strategy 
(Efficiency-
seeking FDI) 
Created Linkages effects Spillovers, clusters, networks  Positive 
externalities 
(horizontal 
FDI) 
Institutions  Market supporting institutions, 
political institutions 
Source: authors 
 
The idea that institutions are not only FDI determinants but also created 
assets has been developed in the empirical literature (Narula, Dunning, 2000; 
Pournarakis, Varsakelis, 2004; Sehti et al. 2002) but we need to know more 
formally which institutions are relevant to attract FDI. This raises the question of 
the institutional pattern and governance. 
 
2.2. Institutions and governance 
Two kinds of institutions should be distinguished: first, the formal 
institutions at the legal, economic and political level, and second, the informal 
institutions more complex to capture because rooted in the social area.  
Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) offer a functional typology of four formal 
institutions that helps us specify what a good market oriented institutional 
pattern could be. The Market creating institutions represent the rules of law that 
define and protect property rights and make contracts fair and reliable for all. 
Such formal institutions based on clear legislation and on an efficient and fair 
judicial system reduce transaction costs and create incentives for investment and 
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private sector development (Bloningen, 2005). Given that context of 
transparency, the degree of corruption should be low. The next three institutions 
support the emergence of a social consensus about risks, burden and prosperity 
sharing. The Market regulating institutions help to regulate market externalities, 
imperfect and asymmetric information or scale economies in sectors like 
transportation, telecommunication or environment. Regulation stresses on fair 
competition, distortions minimization, and enhance privatisation and 
deregulation. The Market stabilizing institutions reduce macroeconomic 
instabilities (inflation, currency rate, balanced budget, tax burden, trade policy, 
fiscal rules, banking system), prevent major political crises and contribute to the 
insertion of the countries in international trade. As Dhakal et al. (2007) noticed 
foreign investors are seeking openness and deregulation particularly if their 
affiliates are cost minimization-oriented. 
Finally, the market legitimizing institutions support social protection and 
manage social conflicts. It can be an insurance system or a welfare system that 
protects a minima people from social dropping out. These institutions create 
favourable socio-economic conditions (Insurance system, welfare system, 
education, infrastructure, and business development). Political institutions are 
not only complementary to the economic ones but they are also mutually 
reinforcing. For example, the transparency of the government actions contributes 
to the shaping of a stable environment for actors. Busse (2004) demonstrates that 
FDI is more sensitive to democracy when foreign firms are seeking new market 
shares development. Reversely, FDI is not democracy sensitive in the case of 
raw materials and energy exploitation.  
Informal institutions rely on culture, mentalities, habits, trust, norms, 
conventions, codes, networks, and even on nationalism (acceptance to sell 
national assets to foreigners, Ethnic tensions) or religion. Knowles and 
Weatherston (2006) noticed that informal institutions, assimilated to culture 
(Tabellini, 2010) or social capital (Putnam et al., 1993), are fundamental in 
explaining development and income differences. In some transitional countries, 
informal institutions play a major role (Jütting, 2003) in deterring the adoption 
of best practices and the change of habits.  
Formal institutions are introduced (imposed?) by the State in a top down 
logic while informal institutions are developed by the community, in a bottom 
up logic. Transition makes the former institutional pattern ill fitted so that a new 
institutional pattern needs to be set up rapidly. Therefore, the quality of the 
institutions becomes a key factor particularly in attracting FDI (Benassy-Quéré 
et al. 2007).  
Recent empirical analyses generally retain three definitions of the 
“quality” of the institutions: the quality of public affairs management, the 
existence of laws protecting the private property and the application of these 
laws, and the limits imposed on political leaders (Daude, Stein 2007; Kessing et 
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al., 2009; Wernick et al., 2009). These analyses put forward various measures of 
the quality of the institutions among which we generally distinguish objective 
and subjective ones. Objective indicators try to measure indirectly the quality of 
institutions. This raises the problem of the phenomenon which is actually 
measured.  If we take into account the condemnation rate for corruption in a 
country, does the indicator reflect a high level of corruption or the good 
performance of justice? Moreover, these indicators exist only on restricted 
samples and consequently limit the use of international comparisons. Subjective 
measurements are founded on appreciations and evaluations of experts or on 
evaluations of the population through surveys carried out by international 
organizations and NGOs
7
. Obviously subjective, these measures of the quality of 
institutions raise some difficulties. For example, a data survey, to apprehend 
correctly the situation, needs to rest on a broad sample, which is expensive to 
carry out. Moreover, it is not excluded that the interpretation of a question varies 
according to the country where one is located (i.e. the perception of human 
rights in France compared to China). For their part, the evaluations of experts 
generally rest on a restricted number of opinions, which poses the problem of the 
sample size and, as Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) stressed, of the 
possibility of an ideological bias. 
In spite of the fact that international organizations (Heritage foundation, 
Transparency International, World Bank, EBRD) publish data and indicators 
based on survey and experts‟ rating, international comparisons are difficult to 
draw. Consequently, the indicators must be used carefully (Bloningen, 2005). 
Measuring institutions is complex and does not make it easy to identify with 
exactitude which institution is responsible for the bad/good economic 
performances. In that context, how to draw some recommendations of economic 
policies? Last but not least, models suppose that institutions are endogenous. But 
if institutions influence the economic results of a country, economic variables 
may reversely influence institutions. This raises a causality problem able to 
generate a bias of simultaneity. 
As noticed by Busse et al. (2007), institution quality may be approached 
by governance defined by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008, p.7) as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them”. Dixit (2009) considers 
that good economic governance contributes to the protection of property rights, 
                                                          
7 See http://einstein.library.emory.edu/govinstlinks.html for databases on the quality of 
institutions. 
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enforces contracts and supports “collective action to provide appropriate 
physical and organizational infrastructure”.  
The higher the quality of governance, the better it will influence the 
decisions of the firms to invest in a specific country. A high quality of 
governance will, at a firm level, help to reduce transaction costs. At a country 
level, it announces that the government is committed to provide a stable business 
environment and to set up market friendly policies. It is a “positive” signal given 
to foreign firms (Benassy-Quéré et al. 2007).  
 
3. The local institutional arrangement and FDI 
Rodrik (2004) argues that each stage of economic development implies 
different “institutional arrangements”. A catching up process may involve some 
originality in an institutional pattern, depending on each country‟s characteristics 
(Murell, 2008). We consider that a good institutional arrangement is the 
interplay between a new set of formal economic and political rules (mostly 
inspired from western practices
8
) and a set of informal institutions. The 
compatibility (or incompatibility) between these two types of institutions may 
explain the wide variations in the impact of law and institutional reform across 
countries and hence on FDI inflows. 
 
3.1. FDI and the institution-based attractiveness 
To understand the nature of the local institutional arrangement we need to 
consider different areas of interaction such as the social structure of the country, 
the rules of the games, the play of the game, the allocation mechanism (Jütting, 
2003). If the rules are efficient, the economic, political, legal and social 
interactions will create effective conditions for FDI.  
The local institutional arrangement is a recombination (Djelic and Quack 
2003) that includes a mix of institution creation (greenfield institution) and 
institution reshaping (brownfield institution)
9
 in order to create a new 
environment for business and to help the transformation of local organisations 
and institutions. The speed of institutional recombination depends on the 
matching of formal institutions with informal ones. It is a protection against 
stickiness or incompatibility between imported rules and local practices.  
                                                          
8 It is the case of candidate countries willing to enter the EU and having to respond to the Acquis 
communautaire requirements. 
9 Greenfield Institutions did not exist under the communist era and needed to be created and 
introduced while Brownfield Institutions existed but needed to be adapted and reshaped to fit the 
market economy. The problem is to identify and fight local reluctance among actors unwilling to 
get rid of their former but outdated practices and/or unable to adopt new practices. 
INWARD FDI IN SEVEN TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES   85 
 
The local institutional arrangement relies on the articulation between 
institutions but also on their credibility and flexibility (Zheng, 2006) so that two 
countries with identical institutions may attract different amounts of FDI.  
Having presented what we regard as an institution-based attractiveness 
for FDI, our purpose needs now an illustration. 
 
3.2. SEE-7 host countries: the leaders and the followers 
Neither institution nor institutional arrangement is optimal. Nevertheless, 
some institutional environments are more favorable to economic development 
than others (Berthelier et al., 2003) and the ability of institutions to adapt 
appears to be an advantage for a country (Brousseau, 2000). The concept of 
institutional profile reflects the idea that, starting from a panel of available 
institutions, we can define a set of characteristics that make countries 
comparable.  
To establish this institutional profile we used the global governance index 
(WGI) developed at the World Bank. As Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi wrote 
(2008, p. 7) “we define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised”. Considering that governance is an 
approximation of formal and informal institutions of a country, the authors split 
the governance into six dimensions all measurable by an indicator telling a level 
of governance perception. These six indicators are: Voice and accountability, 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory quality, Rule of Law, and Control of corruption. Finally, they 
construct an aggregate indicator from these six indicators. Good governance at 
each level will result in good global governance, which may be considered as a 
safe fundament for institutions building.  
Figure 1 ranks the SEE-7 according to the quality of their global 
governance. The global governance is the sum of the averages of the six 
indicators for the period 1996 – 2009 calculated for each country. Each indicator 
may vary from -2.5 to 2.5 so that their sum may vary, in theory, from -15 to + 
15. For the SEE-7 the interval is between -4.2 and 1.35. Three countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) get positive global governance and may be 
considered as having a relatively good quality of institutions. Without surprise, 
the other countries have negative global governance, among them Bosnia and 
Serbia at war for a long time. The former may be considered as leaders, and the 
latter as followers (FIAS, 2007). 
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Figure 1. Country ranking according to their global governance (average 
1996-2009) 
 
Sources: Calculus from authors according to the WGI database (various issues) 
Wired at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm> 
 
Table 2 gives more details about the institutional profile of each country 
and its evolution between 1996 and 2009. One indicator (control of corruption) 
has a negative score for the whole period and all the countries except Croatia. It 
is approximately the same for Government effectiveness and the Rule of Law. 
Only Croatia and Romania, during the period, have a shift from a negative score 
to a positive one. This indicates that public governance in SEE-7 is weak 
including for new EU members. Nevertheless, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania 
have relatively good performances compared to the other SEE selected. Their 
scores improved during the period for almost all the criteria. 
 
Table 2. The quality of institutions (1996 VS 2009) 
 
Albania Bosnia-Herz. Macedonia Serbia 
1996 2009 1996 2009 1996 2009 1996 2009 
Voice & Accountability 
Political, civil and human rights 
-0,57 0,16 -0,5 -0,05 -0,04 0,13 -1,38 0,32 
Political stability no violence 
Violence, political stability, absence 
of terrorism 
-0,12 -0,07 -0,50 -0,57 -1,28 -0,65 -1,11 -0,50 
Government effectiveness 
Efficient bureaucracy, quality of 
public service delivery 
-0,54 -0,20 -1,28 -0,65 -0,47 -0,14 -0,45 -0,15 
Regulatory Quality 
Market friendly policies 
0,04 0,28 -0,60 -0,06 -0,07 0,32 -1,22 -0,10 
Rule of Law 
Quality of contract, police and 
justice, crime  
-0,01 -0,52 -0,02 -0,39 -0,11 -0,22 -1,00 -0,41 
Control of corruption 
Measures corrupted practices 
0,05 -0,40 -0,26 -0,31 -1,07 -0,03 -1,06 -0,19 
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Bulgaria Croatia Romania 
1996 2009 1996 2009 1996 2009 
Voice & Accountability 
Political, civil and human rights 
0,11 -0,34 0,18 0,56 0,18 0,46 
Political stability no violence 
Violence, political stability, absence of terrorism 
-0,22 -0,10 0,39 0,60 0,39 0,40 
Government effectiveness 
Efficient bureaucracy, quality of public service 
delivery 
-0,96 0,01 -0,82 0,64 -0,82 -0,13 
Regulatory Quality 
Market friendly policies 
0,19 0,14 -0,23 0,55 -0,23 0,62 
Rule of Law 
Quality of contract, police and justice, crime  
-0,04 -0,55 0,01 0,22 0,01 0,10 
Control of corruption 
Measures corrupted practices 
-1,02 -1,01 -0,23 0,03 -0,23 -0,13 
Sources:  WGI database (various issues), Wired at 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm> 
 
The FIAS (2007) survey on foreign investor‟s expectations about SEE 
attractiveness confirms that Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria are the leading host 
countries and that the other countries are lagging behind because of a lack in 
business environment stability, infrastructure reliability, and a low perspective to 
enter the EU. The survey points out that demand is also an important 
determinant of FDI in SEE. 68% of the surveyed investors are attracted by the 
market size and 61 % by the GDP growth. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Transition is a two-step process. First, it is a global shift towards market 
economy that may be guided by international institutions and/or the EU. Second, 
it is a specific direction taken by each country in order to articulate a panel of 
local institutions with the requirements of the market economy. In that sense, 
institutions and their combination (institutional arrangement) become the corner 
stone of growth and FDI attraction.  
We put forward two institutional profiles in the present paper. The first 
(EU members and candidate countries) reflects a profile where the institutional 
arrangement attracts FDI, as well as demand. The second (other SEE countries) 
presents a profile where institutions are considered weak. The first profile may 
expect to host FDI in a long-term perspective and gain from the presence of 
foreign investors through spillovers and knowledge transfers. The second, to 
avoid hosting nomad FDI, needs to improve the institutional pattern towards 
more reliable and effective reforms. We can conclude on the fact that reforms 
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need to be effective and perceived as such by actors. Reform effectiveness 
reflects the quality of the governance, which reflects the quality of institutions.  
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